BVerwG – 6 C 1.24

2 February 2026

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A court held that a government employee working in financial crime enforcement was entitled to have his home address blocked from disclosure in the public register. Such protection may be granted where a person’s specific professional role exposes them to a real risk of threats or violence, even if the individual has not yet been personally targeted.

== English Summary ==

=== Facts ===
The data subject was employed by the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin), the public authority responsible for supervising banks, financial service providers, and insurance companies. He worked as a case officer in a specialised unit dealing with serious financial misconduct, including organised crime and terrorism financing. Due to their work, employees in this unit regularly issue binding decisions, conduct on-site inspections, and may appear as witnesses in criminal proceedings, which makes them identifiable to affected persons.

Because several employees in this unit had been threatened in the past, the data subject’s home address had been blocked from disclosure in the population register for many years. When the blocking period expired, he applied for a renewal. The local registration authority refused the request on the ground that no individual threat against the claimant had been demonstrated. The lower administrative court dismissed the claim, while the Higher Administrative Court ordered the renewal. The registration authority appealed to the Federal Administrative Court.

=== Holding ===
The Court dismissed the appeal and confirmed that the address block had to be entered.

The Court held that an address may be blocked where there are objectively verifiable facts showing that disclosure could endanger a person’s life, health, personal freedom, or similarly protected interests. This requires an individualised risk assessment, but it does not require that the applicant has already been personally threatened. Risks arising from a specific professional activity may suffice, particularly where other persons performing essentially the same tasks have been subjected to threats or attacks.

In this case, the Court had to find a balance between the public’s right to transparency of information, and the employee’s right to privacy and protection of personal data, under the GDPR and Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

Applying these principles, the Court found that the claimant’s work in a unit dealing with organised crime and terrorism financing, together with documented threats against colleagues in the same unit, justified the conclusion that disclosure of his address could expose him to serious risks. Where these conditions are met, the registration authority has no discretion and must block the address for the statutory period.

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== English Machine Translation of the Decision ==
The decision below is a machine translation of the German original. Please refer to the German original for more details.

<pre>
Judgment

Federal Administrative Court (BVerwG) 6 C 1.24

Cologne Administrative Court (VG Köln) – December 3, 2021 – Case No.: 25 K 47/19
Münster Higher Administrative Court (OVG Münster) – November 29, 2023 – Case No.: 19 A 40/22

In the administrative dispute, the Sixth Senate of the Federal Administrative Court,

in the oral hearing of November 5, 2025,

with presiding judge Prof. Dr. Kraft, judges Dr. Möller and Hahn, and

judges Steiner and Dr. Gamp,

rendered as follows:

The defendant’s appeal against the judgment of the Higher Administrative Court for the State of North Rhine-Westphalia of November 29, 2023, is dismissed.

The defendant shall bear the costs of the appeal proceedings.

Grounds

1. The plaintiff seeks the renewed issuance of a blocking order in the defendant’s residents’ registration office.

2. He is employed as a case worker in the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (hereinafter: BaFin) in Department … – …. This department regularly investigates cases of domestic and foreign organized crime, terrorist financing, and the so-called Reichsbürger movement. It comprises approximately 70 employees and is divided into five sections. Section … is responsible for fundamental issues, appeals, and court proceedings. Sections … to … are each responsible for specific federal states regarding licensing requirements and the prosecution of unauthorized banking, financial services, investment, payment services, e-money, and insurance transactions. Section … is responsible for audits, searches, monitoring compliance with licensing requirements, prosecution (abroad), and exemptions. The plaintiff works in Section …. The employees of Sections … to … have special powers in cases of detected violations. They appear by name when signing official notices and during on-site meetings by presenting their official identification. The measures they take are published on the BaFin website, including the name of the company that committed the violation. They are called as witnesses in criminal proceedings. In recent years, there have been repeated threatening and intimidating incidents against individual employees of the department. Therefore, the defendant had continuously entered a block on the plaintiff’s personal information in the residents’ registration office from June 2003 onwards.

3 On September 14, 2018, the plaintiff, represented by BaFin, applied for the reissuance of a block on his personal information in the residents’ registration office, citing individual threats against other employees of the department and the dangers he also faces from his professional activities. By decision dated December 10, 2018, the defendant rejected the renewed granting of the block, as an individual threat to the plaintiff had not been proven.

4
With the action filed on January 4, 2019, the plaintiff continues to pursue his claim. The Administrative Court dismissed the action. On appeal by the plaintiff, the Higher Administrative Court amended the Administrative Court’s judgment and, setting aside the rejection notice, ordered the defendant to extend the blocking order in the residents’ registration office. The admissible action for performance was well-founded. The plaintiff has a right to the extension of the blocking order. The legal basis for this claim is the revised version of Section 51 Paragraph 1 of the Federal Registration Act (BMG), which entered into force on April 3, 2021, and modified the previous legal situation. The earlier case law of the Federal Administrative Court is therefore partially obsolete. The requirements of Section 51 Paragraph 1 Sentence 1 of the BMG are met if there is a suspicion of danger relating to a specific, personal risk that threatens the person concerned or another person as a result of the disclosure of the information. An abstract, heightened risk typical of a particular profession only fulfills the elements of the offense if, in conjunction with other circumstances, it justifies the suspicion of a concrete, personal threat. The legislature has removed the abstract, profession-specific risk, developed in case law for exceptional cases, from the scope of the current Section 51 Paragraph 1 Sentence 1 of the Federal Law on the Protection of Personal Rights (BMG) and downgraded general activity-related attacks in professional, mandate-related, and voluntary activities to one of several risk factors for establishing a concrete, personal threat. Threats to a specific professional group alone no longer justify a concrete, personal threat within the meaning of Section 51 Paragraph 1 Sentence 1 of the BMG.

The legislature has removed the abstract, profession-specific risk, developed in case law for exceptional cases, from the scope of the current Section 51 Paragraph 1 Sentence 1 of the BMG and downgraded general activity-related attacks in professional, mandate-related, and voluntary activities to one of several risk factors for establishing a concrete, personal threat. 5
Applying these principles, and considering the supplementary statements submitted by BaFin during the appeal proceedings regarding individual incidents, sufficient facts exist to justify the assumption that the plaintiff, due to his specific professional activity as a case worker in the department … of BaFin, could be exposed to a risk to his life, health, or similar interests worthy of protection as a result of information from the residents’ registration office. This is because all persons employed there are interchangeable officials entrusted with largely identical tasks and are outwardly identifiable as responsible for the orders or on-site measures. This results in the mandatory obligation to extend the blocking order (§ 51 para. 4 sentence 2 BMG). The defendant has no discretion in this matter. The defendant could decide on the extension request without being bound by any instructions from BaFin. The authority to verify whether the prerequisites for registering a block on the disclosure of personal data are met also lies with the registration authority in those cases where it is to register such a block ex officio, pursuant to Section 34 Paragraph 5 Sentence 1, Section 51 Paragraph 2 Sentence 2, Paragraph 3 of the Federal Registration Act (BMG), “at the instigation of an authority named in Section 34 Paragraph 4 Sentence 1 Numbers 1 to 4, 6 to 9, and 11.”

6. The Higher Regional Court granted leave to appeal to clarify the factual prerequisites of the amended Section 51 Paragraph 1 of the Federal Registration Act (BMG). With its appeal, the defendant seeks to reinstate the judgment of the court of first instance. The plaintiff, on the other hand, defends the judgment of the Higher Regional Court. The representative of the federal interest at the Federal Administrative Court explained that a significant increase in the number of blocking orders could impair digital inquiries to public authorities and citizen services due to the necessity of manual processing.

6. II

7
The admissible appeal on points of law is unfounded. Without violating Section 42 Paragraph 1 Alternative 2 of the Code of Administrative Court Procedure (VwGO), the Higher Administrative Court considered the action seeking the registration of a block on disclosure in the residents’ registration office to be an admissible – and otherwise also permissible – action for performance. According to the established case law of the Senate, the registration of such a block is an administrative act that includes an order, effective against third parties, not to disclose the plaintiff’s address (see Federal Administrative Court, Judgment of June 21, 2006 – 6 C 5.05 – BVerwGE 126, 140, para. 12). The legal principles established by the Higher Administrative Court in its considerations regarding the merits of the case with respect to Section 51 Paragraph 1 Sentences 1 and 3 of the Federal Registration Act (BMG) do, however, violate applicable law within the meaning of Section 137 Paragraph 1 No. 1 of the Code of Administrative Court Procedure (VwGO) (1.). However, applying the correct standard leads to the same result, so the contested decision proves to be correct for other reasons, § 144 para. 4 VwGO (2.).

8
1. Section 51 para. 1 of the Federal Registration Act of May 3, 2013 (Federal Law Gazette I p. 1084) as amended by Article 4 No. 1 of the Act to Combat Right-Wing Extremism and Hate Crime of March 30, 2021 (Federal Law Gazette I p. 441), BMG, establishes the requirements for registering a block on the disclosure of information in the residents’ register. This version entered into force on April 3, 2021 (Article 10, paragraph 1 of the aforementioned Act of March 30, 2021, and Article 15, number 6 of the further Act of March 30, 2021, Federal Law Gazette I, p. 448). According to Section 51, paragraph 1, sentence 1 of the Federal Registration Act (BMG), the registration authority must, upon application or ex officio, enter a block on the disclosure of information in the registration register free of charge if there are facts that justify the assumption that the person concerned or another person could be endangered in life, health, personal freedom, or similar interests worthy of protection by the disclosure of information from the registration register. Section 51, paragraph 1, sentence 2 of the BMG now stipulates that, in particular, the protection of the person concerned or another person from threats, insults, and unauthorized stalking constitutes a similar interest worthy of protection. In determining whether facts exist within the meaning of Section 51 Paragraph 1 Sentence 1 of the Federal Registration Act (BMG), it must also be considered whether the person concerned or another person belongs to a group of people who, due to their professional or voluntary activities, are generally subject to increased hostility or other attacks (Section 51 Paragraph 1 Sentence 3 BMG). The blocking order is limited to two years (Section 51 Paragraph 4 Sentence 1 BMG). It can be extended upon application or ex officio (Section 51 Paragraph 4 Sentence 2 BMG).

9 The preceding version of Section 51 Paragraph 1 BMG is to be applied in the present case (a.). The statutory provision allows for the repeated registration of a blocking order for two years at a time (b.). The blocking order is registered upon application or ex officio (c.). In substantive terms, it requires that facts exist which justify the assumption that the person concerned or another person may be endangered in life, health, personal freedom, or similar interests worthy of protection by the disclosure of information from the residents’ registration office (d.).

10
a. According to the established case law of the Federal Administrative Court, the legal situation relevant to the court’s decision is derived from substantive law, which provides not only the factual prerequisites for a legal basis for authorization or a claim itself, but also the answer to the question of when these prerequisites must be met (Federal Administrative Court, judgments of March 31, 2004 – 8 C 5.03 – BVerwGE 120, 246 <250> and of September 16, 2020 – 6 C 10.19 – Buchholz 403.1 Allg. DatenschutzR No. 21 para. 13). The decisive factor is therefore which legal provisions, according to their intended purpose, are deemed to apply to the assessment of the claim at the time of the decision, regardless of whether it is a declaratory action, a performance action, an action for annulment or an action for performance. In the present performance situation, where action is required of the authority, this will generally be the last oral hearing, unless substantive law provides an indication of a different point in time (cf. Federal Administrative Court, judgments of June 9, 2010 – 6 C 5.09 – BVerwGE 137, 113 para. 23, of December 4, 2014 – 4 C 33.13 – BVerwGE 151, 36 para. 18, of September 16, 2020 – 6 C 10.19 – Buchholz 403.1 Allg. DatenschutzR No. 21 paras. 13 et seq. and of March 2, 2022 – 6 C 7.20 – BVerwGE 175, 76 para. 24). The basis to be applied, therefore – as the appeal judgment correctly assumes – is the version of Section 51 Paragraph 1 BMG that came into force on April 3, 2021.

11
b. The interplay between Section 51, paragraphs 1 and 4, sentences 1 and 2 of the Federal Registration Act (BMG) indicates that a registration block can be entered multiple times consecutively for two-year periods. While the different wording in Section 51, paragraph 1, sentence 1 of the BMG (“to be entered”) and in Section 51, paragraph 4, sentence 2 of the BMG (“extended”) might seem to suggest that the Federal Registration Act distinguishes between an initial entry and the extension of an already registered registration block, an extension is also subject to the requirements of Section 51, paragraph 1, sentence 1 of the BMG. The legal position granted in the past does not enjoy any protection of legitimate expectations for the future (see Bavarian Administrative Court of Appeal, judgment of December 2, 2015 – 5 B 15.14 23 – NVwZ-RR 2016, 543, para. 21). Section 51(4), sentence 2 of the Federal Registration Act (BMG) must be viewed in conjunction with Section 51(4), sentence 1 of the BMG. According to this provision, the blocking of information is to be limited to two years. Against this background, Section 51(4), sentence 2 of the BMG merely clarifies that a repeated issuance is permissible if the conditions of Section 51(1), sentence 1 of the BMG continue to be met.

12. Substantive law, understood in this way, determines the subject matter of the court proceedings in which the registration of a blocking of information is sought. An action for performance aims at the registration of a blocking of information even if the two-year period of a previously granted block has not yet expired. A judgment in favor of the plaintiff can only compel the registration authority to register a new block, not to extend an existing or expired blocking of information. Accordingly, the two-year period under Section 51 Paragraph 4 Sentence 1 of the Federal Registration Act (BMG) begins—regardless of the expiration date of a previously registered block—with the judgment of the last court of first instance. Due to its obligation to adhere to the factual findings of the lower court (Section 137 Paragraph 2 of the Code of Administrative Court Procedure (VwGO)), the Federal Administrative Court’s review is limited to the existence of the right to registration of a block on the disclosure of information at the relevant time of the last oral hearing before the court of first instance. Therefore, the decision of the court of first instance is not capable of triggering a new two-year period within the meaning of Section 51 Paragraph 4 Sentence 1 of the BMG.

c. Pursuant to Section 51 Paragraph 1 Sentence 1 of the BMG, the registration of the block on the disclosure of information is carried out ex officio or upon a corresponding application. In the present case, the plaintiff has submitted an application for the renewed registration of a block on the disclosure of information. As in previous years, he was represented by his employment agency, which submitted the application to the defendant on his behalf (appeal judgment, p. 3).

14
d. Section 51(1), sentence 1, of the Federal Registration Act (BMG) requires a risk assessment based on objectively verifiable facts that considers the individual circumstances of the specific person. Upon reasonable evaluation of these facts, there must be a concern that the person concerned is at risk of having their legally protected interests infringed by the information from the registration office disclosed (aa.). The appellate court’s differing interpretation, that a mere suspicion of danger is sufficient, relating to a specific, personal danger that threatens the person concerned or another person through the disclosure, is not in accordance with Section 51(1), sentence 1, of the BMG (bb.). The factual material relevant for the prognosis includes – as clarified by the new legal provision in Section 51 Paragraph 1 Sentence 3 of the Federal Registration Act (BMG) – membership in a group of persons who, due to their professional or voluntary activities, are generally exposed to a greater degree of hostility or other attacks (cc.). The Court of Appeal’s view that abstract, increased risks typical of certain professions have been removed from the scope of Section 51 Paragraph 1 Sentence 1 of the BMG and downgraded to one of several risk factors, with the consequence that risks to a specific professional group alone no longer justify a concrete suspicion of personal danger within the meaning of Section 51 Paragraph 1 Sentence 1 of the BMG, contradicts the current legal situation (dd.). Contrary to the plaintiff’s view, neither the case law on civil service law of the Federal Administrative Court nor EU law provides for any further requirements for the registration of a block on the disclosure of information (ee.). The fulfillment of the requirements of Section 51 Paragraph 1 Sentence 1 of the Federal Registration Act (BMG) is subject to unrestricted judicial review.

15
aa. The wording of Section 51 Paragraph 1 Sentence 1 of the BMG, with the phrase “facts […] that justify the assumption,” describes the necessity of a fact-based predictive decision as to whether the “danger” required by the provision exists. It must threaten the life, health, personal freedom, or similarly protected interests of the person concerned or of another person who can also be reached at this registered address (e.g., spouse, children). The legislator has clarified what constitutes a similarly protected interest in Section 51 Paragraph 1 Sentence 2 of the BMG. This includes, in particular, protection from threats, insults, and unauthorized stalking. The blocking of information serves to address an existing threat by preventively preventing access to registration data (§§ 44 et seq. of the Federal Registration Act (BMG)), which is possible at any time and without giving reasons, and making it subject to individual review in the hearing procedure pursuant to § 51 para. 2 BMG. While the information from the registration register itself cannot create a threat to the aforementioned legal interests, knowledge of the registration data can certainly “grow” into a threat if a third party decides to act on it. Essentially, this is about the effective protection of citizens against the misuse of data collected by the registration authorities due to the statutory registration obligation; that is, about sector-specific data protection (see already BT-Drs. 8/3825, pp. 1 et seq.). § 51 para. 1 sentence 1 BMG therefore contains a specific registration-related concept of threat, which differs from the classic police threat due to the preventive threat intended by a blocking of information.

… 16
Objectively verifiable facts are required that can comprehensibly support the required predictive decision. General experience, mere assumptions, or fears are insufficient. According to the wording of the law, the individual circumstances of the specific person are decisive (Federal Administrative Court, decisions of March 7, 2016 – 6 B 11.16 – juris para. 6 and of February 14, 2017 – 6 B 49.16 – NJW 2017, 1832 para. 6). Individual circumstances include, among other things, the specific professional activity. Special family circumstances (e.g., separation from an abusive partner) or other personal harassment (victims of stalking, witnesses in criminal proceedings, etc.) can also constitute concrete risk factors. A reasonable assessment of these connecting facts requires a concern that the legal interests mentioned in Section 51 Paragraph 1 Sentence 1 of the Federal Registration Act (BMG) will be impaired by means of the registration data. A purely subjective concern, for which no reasonable basis is apparent on the grounds of objectively ascertainable facts, is insufficient.

17
bb. The Court of Appeal’s legal interpretation, which relies on a mere suspicion of danger, is incompatible with Section 51 Paragraph 1 Sentence 1 of the Federal Registration Act (BMG). The use of the concept of suspected danger, familiar from the area of police and public order authority intervention powers (see, for example, Federal Administrative Court, judgment of July 3, 2002 – 6 CN 8.01 – BVerwGE 116, 347 <351> with further references), in the present context misinterprets the specific registration law concept of danger in Section 51 Paragraph 1 Sentence 1 of the Federal Registration Act (BMG). The blocking of information provides protection against misuse of registration data and does not serve to avert or clarify suspected situations within the meaning of police and public order law where uncertainties exist regarding the potential danger or causal chains. The general objective of the legislature, to register a block even before a specific request for information is made (cf. regarding Section 21 Paragraph 5 of the Federal Registration Act: Bundestag Printed Matter 8/3825, p. 25, and Federal Administrative Court, Judgment of June 21, 2006 – 6 C 5.05 – BVerwGE 126, 140, para. 17), does not lead to the legal concept of suspected danger. As the wording of Section 51 Paragraph 1 Sentence 1 of the Federal Registration Act expresses, a risk assessment based on relevant facts must be made in each individual case. The provisions of nationality, passport, and identity card law cited by the Court of Appeal also do not justify the application of the concept of suspected danger, because legal norms must always be assessed within their respective regulatory context.

18
cc. The factual material to be considered in the risk assessment also includes membership in a group of people who, due to their professional or voluntary activities, are generally exposed to a higher degree of hostility or other attacks (Section 51, Paragraph 1, Sentence 3 of the Federal Registration Act). It is required that the applicant’s specific professional or voluntary activities and those of the affected group of people are essentially the same in factual terms ((1)). Furthermore, sufficiently detailed factual findings regarding the hostility and other attacks are required, demonstrating that, based on the number and frequency of specific threats that exist or have already occurred in individual cases, the conclusion that the person affected is also at risk is justified. However, it is not necessary to submit empirically collected evidence or statistics for the comparability of the threat situation ((2)).

(2) 19

(1) In Section 51(1), sentence 3, of the Federal Registration Act (BMG), the legislator stipulated that, when establishing the facts, it must also be taken into account whether the person concerned or another person belongs to a group of persons who, due to their professional or voluntary activities, are generally exposed to a greater degree of hostility or other attacks. According to the explanatory memorandum to the draft law, the aim was to provide better protection against hostility or other attacks resulting from professional or voluntary engagement (see BT-Drs. 19/17741, pp. 2, 4, 39). The legislator saw a need for this in light of the Senate’s case law on occupational hazards (regarding the dangers that threaten abstractly from occupational activity, see BVerwG, decisions of March 7, 2016 – 6 B 11.16 – juris para. 6 and of February 14, 2017 – 6 B 49.16 – NJW 2017, 1832 para. 6 et seq.).

20
The wording of Section 51 Paragraph 1 Sentence 3 of the Federal Registration Act (BMG) clarifies that it refers to the specific professional or voluntary activity being carried out, and not to membership in a particular profession or even an entire professional group. As clarified in the explanatory memorandum to the draft law (Bundestag Printed Matter 19/17741, p. 39), exceeding the threshold of risk with regard to a specific person continues to require a presentation of their circumstances. These circumstances have always included the specific professional or voluntary activities undertaken (see Federal Administrative Court, decisions of March 7, 2016 – 6 B 11.16 – juris para. 6 and of February 14, 2017 – 6 B 49.16 – NJW 2017, 1832 para. 6). In assessing the associated risks, the legislator intended to broaden the perspective by also considering the hostility and other attacks that other individuals face because of this specific professional or voluntary activity. The risk assessment should therefore not be based solely on facts indicating an individual threat to the person concerned. Rather, it should also take into account what has happened or is happening to other individuals in a comparable situation to the applicant. If these individuals are subjected to hostility or other attacks because of their specific activity, it is reasonable to assume that the applicant, who has so far been spared such experiences and is requesting a block on their registration, will face a similar threat in the future. However, this conclusion is only justified if the specific professional or voluntary activities are essentially the same.

(2) Furthermore, it is a requirement that the hostility or other attacks to which the group of people is increasingly exposed are sufficiently substantiated by factual findings. They must accept the conclusion that, based on the number and frequency of specific dangers existing or already realized in individual cases, a danger to the person concerned must also be assumed. This is because the material threshold of danger to which Section 51 Paragraph 1 Sentence 1 of the Federal Registration Act (BMG) refers is not lowered by considering dangers that threaten other persons due to their professional or voluntary activities. This would contradict the purposes of the registration system, the provision of information from the registration system, and the exceptional nature of the blocking of information pursuant to Section 51 BMG (see also Federal Administrative Court, Decision of February 14, 2017 – 6 B 49.16 – NJW 2017, 1832, paragraphs 6 et seq.). The addition of sentences 2 and 3 to Section 51(1) of the Federal Registration Act (BMG) has not altered the substantive legal standard for the risk assessment (see, in this context, Higher Administrative Court of Bautzen, decision of June 17, 2021 – 3 A 968/19 – juris para. 27).

22
However, the simplified registration of a blocking order intended by the legislator is significant at the level of legal application (regarding this objective of the legislator: Bundestag Printed Matter 19/17741, p. 4). This is because Section 51(1), sentence 3, of the BMG requires that consideration be given to the fact that the group of persons is “generally” exposed to an increased degree of hostility or other attacks. In light of the legislative objective, this can only be understood as meaning that additional difficulties in proving such attacks should be avoided. It is therefore necessary, but also sufficient, that the number and frequency of the concrete risks already realized or existing for other persons in this group emerge from the substantiated and plausible presentation. Statistical data or results of representative surveys are not required (as was the case under the previous legal situation: Federal Administrative Court, decision of February 14, 2017 – 6 B 49.16 – NJW 2017, 1832, paragraphs 6 and 9).

23
dd. The Court of Appeal’s view that abstract increased risks typical of certain occupational groups have been removed from the scope of application of Section 51 Paragraph 1 Sentence 1 of the Federal Registration Act (BMG) and downgraded to one of several risk factors, and that risks to a specific occupational group alone no longer justify a concrete suspicion of personal danger within the meaning of Section 51 Paragraph 1 Sentence 1 of the BMG, contradicts the law. For it was the express intention of the legislator to attach greater importance to the dangers associated with professional or voluntary activities. Any reduction of their significance would therefore be tantamount to perverting the legislator’s intent. Nor is it conceivable that these dangers have now been removed from the scope of Section 51 Paragraph 1 Sentence 1 of the Federal Registration Act (BMG). On the contrary, the wording of Section 51 Paragraph 1 Sentence 3 of the BMG clearly indicates that such dangers must be taken into account when determining whether “facts within the meaning of Sentence 1 exist.” The regulatory technique chosen by the legislator thus reveals that Section 51 Paragraph 1 Sentence 1 of the BMG constitutes the basic provision that establishes the registration requirements. It is supplemented by Section 51 Paragraph 1 Sentence 2 of the BMG with regard to similarly protected interests. In addition, Section 51(1), sentence 3 of the Federal Registration Act (BMG) contains a provision regarding which circumstances should also be considered when establishing the facts within the meaning of Section 51(1), sentence 1 of the BMG.

24
ee. Contrary to the plaintiffs’ view, neither the case law of the Federal Administrative Court on civil service law nor considerations of EU law can justify any modifications to this standard.

25 The possibility raised by the Second Senate of the Federal Administrative Court, which is responsible for civil service law, during its review of the obligation introduced in the State of Brandenburg for police officers to wear name tags, that these officers could obtain, in addition to a block on the transmission of their data in the vehicle registration records, the entry of a block on the disclosure of their information in the residents’ registration register (Federal Administrative Court, judgment of September 26, 2019 – 2 C 32.18 – BVerwGE 166, 333, para. 29), merely refers to the legal situation. This does not imply any substantive statements regarding the registration requirements for the respective blocking measures.

26. The questions of EU law raised by the plaintiff are also irrelevant with regard to Section 51(1) of the Federal Registration Act (BMG). Even if one were to agree with his argument that simple registration information – especially information obtained via the internet – is subject to concerns under EU law in light of the rulings of the Court of Justice of the European Union (see ECJ, Grand Chamber Judgment of 22 November 2022 – C-37/20 et al. – NJW 2023, 199) concerning the requirements of the General Data Protection Regulation, this could not be compensated for by simplified requirements for a blocking order that disregard the wording of Section 51(1), first sentence, of the Federal Registration Act (BMG). The plaintiff’s concerns relate to the simple disclosure from the residents’ register provided for in Section 44(1), sentence 1, and Section 49(2), sentence 1, of the Federal Registration Act (BMG), which can also be carried out via automated retrieval via the internet. This allows the obtaining of the basic personal data specified in the Act. It does not require the demonstration of a legitimate interest, but merely the unambiguous identification of the person sought based on the information provided by the person requesting the information (Section 44(1), sentence 1, BMG) or – in the case of automated retrieval – by identifying them using the minimum criteria required by Section 49(4) and (5) BMG.

27 If these regulations were to prove incompatible with the right to respect for private and family life, home, and communications protected by Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR) and the right to the protection of personal data concerning them guaranteed by Article 8(1) CFR, which corresponds to the right to privacy of the individual in question under Article 2(1) CFR, the plaintiff argues that the plaintiff’s concerns are unfounded. The first steps in the chain of intervention – the collection and storage of registration data – would be disproportionate to the right to informational self-determination protected under Article 1 Paragraph 1 of the German Basic Law (GG). This would be unlawful even if the first steps in the intervention – the collection and storage of registration data – were to violate EU law. The difficulties in accessing this data resulting from the hearing procedure under Section 51 Paragraph 2 of the Federal Registration Act (BMG) in the case of a registered block on disclosure would not alter this. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which applies to the processing of registration data (Federal Administrative Court, Judgment of March 2, 2022 – 6 C 7.20 – BVerwGE 175, 76, paragraphs 26 et seq.), requires that each individual processing of personal data be lawful (Article 5 Paragraph 1 Letter a, Article 6 GDPR, see also Recital 39 Sentence 1 GDPR). In this respect, it applies – as in national law – that in a chain of interventions, each individual intervention requires justification (cf. in connection with interventions in Article 10 Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law: Federal Constitutional Court, judgments of July 14, 1999 – 1 BvR 2226/94 et al. – BVerfGE 100, 313 <359, 366 et seq.> and of March 2, 2010 – 1 BvR 256/08 et al. – BVerfGE 125, 260 <309 et seq., 313> as well as Federal Administrative Court, judgment of December 13, 2017 – 6 A 6.16 – BVerwGE 161, 76 para. 24). Modifications in subsequent interventions are therefore unsuitable for justifying prior interventions.

2. Even applying the applicable standard of Section 51 Paragraph 1 of the Federal Registration Act (BMG), the action for performance is well-founded (Section 113 Paragraph 5 Sentence 1 of the Code of Administrative Court Procedure (VwGO)). The contested decision is therefore correct for other reasons (Section 144 Paragraph 4 VwGO). The plaintiff has a right to the entry of a block on the disclosure of information in the residents’ register. While such a block is not to be entered by the registration authority without a more detailed examination of the registration requirements simply because one of the authorities listed in Section 34 Paragraph 5 Sentence 1 in conjunction with Paragraph 4 Sentence 1 Numbers 1 to 4, 6 to 9, and 11 of the BMG initiates it, this instigation does not constitute an instruction to the registration authority but merely triggers the independent examination of the registration requirements by the authority responsible for maintaining the residents’ register. In any case, BaFin is not mentioned in Section 34 Paragraph 4 Sentence 1 of the Federal Registration Act (BMG), and its inclusion by analogy to Section 34 Paragraph 4 Sentence 1 Numbers 1 and 2 of the BMG is also precluded (a.). However, the registration requirements of Section 51 Paragraph 1 Sentence 1 in conjunction with Sentence 3 of the BMG are met in the present case (b.), so that the block in favor of the plaintiff must be entered (c.).

a. The Federal Registration Act does not regulate the specific details of the situations in which the registration authority, at the instigation of the authorities named in Section 34, paragraph 5, sentence 1 in conjunction with paragraph 4, sentence 1, numbers 1 to 4, 6 to 9, and 11 of the Federal Registration Act, enters a blocking notice in the residents’ register ex officio. However, it can be inferred from Section 51, paragraph 1, sentence 1 of the Federal Registration Act that only the registration authority is authorized to enter a blocking notice. It is the general rule that the prerequisites for a legal basis are examined by the authority to which the power to trigger the legal consequence is assigned. Deviations from this principle must be sufficiently clear from the law. This is the case with regard to the lack of examination power on the part of the registration authority in those cases in which the authorities named in Section 34, paragraph 5, sentence 1 in conjunction with paragraph 4, sentence 1, numbers 1 to 4, 6 to 9, and 11 of the Federal Registration Act are involved. The authorities mentioned in Section 34, Paragraph 4, Sentence 1, Nos. 1 to 4, 6 to 9, and 11 of the Federal Registration Act (BMG) are not required to contact the registration authority and suggest the registration of a block on the release of information. Rather, it would have been expected that the legislator would have expressed the exemption of the registration authority from the examination of legal requirements as clearly as in Section 34, Paragraph 4, Sentence 1 of the BMG (contra Andoor, ZRP 2021, 23 <24 f.>).

30. In addition, the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) is not mentioned in Section 34, Paragraph 4, Sentence 1 of the BMG. The analogy to Section 34, Paragraph 4, Sentence 1, Nos. 1 and 2 of the BMG advocated by the plaintiff is not applicable because its prerequisites—the existence of a regulatory gap and a comparable situation of interests—are clearly not met. There is no unintended incompleteness of the law. The numerous amendments to the list of authorities in Section 34, Paragraph 4, Sentence 1 of the Federal Registration Act (BMG) since the establishment of BaFin on May 1, 2002, demonstrate the legislator’s intention to keep the list of security and law enforcement agencies up-to-date. The fact that BaFin was nevertheless not included for this extended period must be considered a deliberate decision by the legislator.

31 Furthermore, BaFin is not functionally equivalent to any of the security and law enforcement agencies listed therein, in particular not to the police or the public prosecutor’s office, so there is also no comparable conflict of interest. BaFin is a supervisory authority located within the remit of the Federal Ministry of Finance (see Section 1, Paragraph 1, Sentence 1 of the Financial Services Supervision Act (FinDAG)), even though it possesses specific powers. Its sole responsibility—as its name also indicates—lies in the supervision of credit institutions, insurance companies, securities trading firms, and other financial institutions (see Section 4(1) of the Financial Services Supervision Act (FinDAG), Section 6(1) sentence 1 of the Banking Act (KWG), Section 6(1) sentence 1 of the Securities Trading Act (WpHG), Section 320(1) of the Insurance Supervision Act (VAG), Section 4(1) of the Payment Services Supervision Act (ZAG), and Section 5(1) of the Investment Code (KAGB).

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b. Based on the facts established by the Court of Appeal, it is clear that, as a result of his specific professional activity as a case worker in the section … of the department … of BaFin, the plaintiff’s life, health, and similarly protected interests could be endangered by a registration office inquiry.

33 The factual basis for the risk assessment under Section 51(1) of the Federal Registration Act (BMG) is to be considered a finding of fact. It is the responsibility of the court of first instance to determine and assess the extent of the occupational risks (see Federal Administrative Court, decisions of March 7, 2016 – 6 B 11.16 – juris para. 7 and of February 14, 2017 – 6 B 49.16 – NJW 2017, 1832 para. 4). In the absence of any compelling procedural objections, the Senate is bound by these findings and must base its decision on them (Section 137 para. 2 of the Code of Administrative Court Procedure). The facts established by the court of appeal are sufficiently detailed and enable the Senate to apply them (appeal judgment, pp. 2 et seq. and pp. 19 et seq.).

34 According to the findings of the court of appeal, all employees of Department …, Sections … to …, are entrusted with the same tasks. They are responsible for reviewing licensing requirements and prosecuting unauthorized banking, financial services, investment, payment services, e-money, and insurance activities both domestically and internationally. Only the regional responsibilities are divided among the various departments. Exceptions apply to the staff in Department …, who are responsible for fundamental issues and the handling of appeals and legal proceedings.

35. Due to the activities of this special department of BaFin, there have been repeated instances in the past of concrete threats against employees performing the same tasks as the plaintiff. Of seven incidents over the past 16 years, the Court of Appeal singled out two more recent incidents in May 2022 and November 2023, which it considered particularly significant. In these two cases, the employees in question faced threats to their physical safety and lives because their private addresses were known to the authorities due to their specific professional activities. It is readily convincing that, in the case of a small group of people like the employees of sections … to … in department … of BaFin, even a small number of threats is sufficient, especially since past incidents involved threats to the highest legal interests.

36 The Higher Administrative Court also identified special circumstances for the employees of this department that result in increased risks. For example, the legal framework applicable to BaFin stipulates that the orders must be published on its website, naming the company that committed the violation (see, for example, Section 6 Paragraph 9 of the German Securities Trading Act (WpHG), Section 7a Paragraph 1 Sentence 1 of the German Capital Investment Code (KAGB)). This entails—in addition to the economic consequences of the measures—a very significant public shaming effect on the natural or legal person or association of persons behind the company. In this respect, the trial court’s assessment that retaliatory actions against the person responsible for the published measures are sufficiently likely is understandable. This is all the more true when considering the specific environment in which the department operates. It handles a significant number of cases from a milieu characterized by a lowered threshold not only for the threat but also for the perpetration of violent offenses. The employees of this department process approximately 400 cases per year in the areas of domestic and foreign organized crime, terrorist financing, and those related to the so-called Reichsbürger movement. Domestic and foreign organized crime, in particular, exhibits a high degree of criminal energy and an inherent danger, as the appellate court correctly points out. It is precisely in this environment that serious threats for deterrence and retaliation must be anticipated to a greater extent. The same applies to the area of terrorist financing. This specific environment thus differs significantly from other authorities, which, while also exposed to the pervasive verbal coarsening in society, generally do not have to fear the implementation of threatened acts.

Domestic and foreign organized crime, in particular, exhibits a high level of criminal energy and abstract dangerousness. 37
Based on these specific facts, the Higher Administrative Court convincingly concluded that the plaintiff was also at risk within the meaning of Section 51 Paragraph 1 Sentence 1 of the Federal Registration Act (BMG). The hostility towards the employees is not directed at the individual case worker, but rather at their activity as an interchangeable official who is nevertheless recognizably responsible for the respective order or on-site measure. It depends on unpredictable circumstances in which case—and towards which case worker—those affected by the measures will react.

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c. Since the registration requirements of Section 51 Paragraph 1 Sentence 1 of the Federal Registration Act (BMG) are thus met, a block on the disclosure of information must be entered. The registration authority has no discretion in this matter. With regard to the subject matter of the dispute and the legally prescribed time limit for the block pursuant to Section 51 Paragraph 4 Sentence 1 of the Federal Registration Act (BMG), it must be clarified that, in the present case, the block in the registration register is only to be entered for the remaining portion of the two-year period from the date of the successful appeal judgment.

3. The decision on costs is based on Section 154 Paragraph 1 of the Code of Administrative Court Procedure (VwGO).
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